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USING THE CONCEPT OF “A PHILOSOPHY OF LAWYERING” IN 
TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
NATHAN M. CRYSTAL* 
INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers face many decisions in connection with the practice of law.  The 
most important and most difficult decisions require the exercise of sound 
professional judgment and discretion.1  To guide them in the exercise of 
judgment, lawyers need to develop what I call a “philosophy of lawyering,” a 
principle-based approach for making difficult professional decisions.2  Law 
school courses on ethics and professional responsibility can be enriched, 
deepened, and made more relevant to students if teachers help students begin 
to develop their own philosophy of lawyering to deal with the difficult 
questions they will face in the practice of law.  In this article I offer 
suggestions for how this can be done. 
I.  THREE DIMENSIONS OF DECISIONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Lawyers encounter issues of professional responsibility at three 
interrelated levels: the practice level, the personal level, and the professional or 
institutional level.  The practice level refers to ethical issues involving the 
representation of clients.  For example, lawyers must decide the fees that they 
will charge, how to resolve conflicts of interests, when to disclose confidential 
 
* Class of 1969 Professor of Professional Responsibility, University of South Carolina School of 
Law. 
 1. I draw a distinction between a lawyer’s ethical obligations specified by the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct, a lawyer’s legal obligations determined by the law governing lawyers 
and other applicable law, and a lawyer’s exercise of professional judgment.  When the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct and applicable law do not provide clear answers to issues of 
professional responsibility, as is often the case, lawyers must exercise professional judgment. 
 2. I have presented the concept of a philosophy of lawyering in my article, Nathan Crystal, 
Developing a Philosophy of Lawyering, 14 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 75 (2000) 
[hereinafter Crystal, Developing a Philosophy of Lawyering], and in my book, NATHAN 
CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION (3d 
ed. 2004) [hereinafter CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY].  See also W. Bradley Wendel, 
Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 113 (2000) (arguing that the foundational 
values of legal ethics are plural and often incommensurable, resulting in the need for lawyers to 
exercise professional judgment). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1236 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:1235 
information to prevent harm to others, and whether their duties to a tribunal 
override their obligations of loyalty and zealous representation of clients. 
At the personal level lawyers must decide the relationship between their 
private lives and their professional commitments.  Many lawyers face the 
dilemma of balancing advancement of their professional careers with the needs 
of their families.  Lawyers must also decide how their personal or religious 
values relate to their obligations as lawyers.  Two of the most important 
personal decisions a lawyer makes are choice of area of practice and selection 
of law firm or other organization in which the lawyer will conduct that 
practice. 
Finally, at the professional level lawyers must decide the extent of their 
involvement in and position on issues facing the profession as a whole rather 
than the lawyer individually.3  At the professional level, lawyers face two 
varieties of issues—issues of professional involvement and issues of 
professional structure.  The amount of time that a lawyer decides to devote to 
pro bono activities and the nature of that commitment is an issue of 
professional involvement.  The lawyer’s position with regard to how the 
profession should respond to the clearly demonstrated need for greater delivery 
of legal services is an issue of professional structure.4 
These three dimensions of professional responsibility are overlapping 
rather than distinct.  For example, a lawyer’s selection of a particular area of 
practice profoundly affects the types of ethical issues the lawyer will face.5  
Similarly, lawyers who are strongly committed to family values may find that 
they are less willing and less able to devote time to professional issues. 
II.  THE EXTENT OF DISCRETION IN DECIDING 
ISSUES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Clear rules govern some issues of professional responsibility.  For 
example, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide that lawyers who 
enter into contingent fee agreements with their clients must have written 
agreements signed by their clients that comply with certain requirements 
 
 3. Some lawyers may decide to devote their time to political, social, or community 
activities rather than strictly professional activities.  I use the term “professional level” broadly to 
include such efforts. 
 4. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004). 
 5. Professor Monroe Freedman has argued that decisions regarding area of practice and 
whether to undertake representation of a client are fundamental moral decisions.  Monroe H. 
Freedman, The Lawyer’s Moral Obligation of Justification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 111 (1995).  In a 
visit to the University of South Carolina Law School a number of years ago, he emphasized this 
obligation with the following quip, which I have paraphrased: “If you don’t want to represent 
clients who lie, who cheat, or who kill for money, then you shouldn’t go into corporate practice.” 
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specified in the Rules.6 Lawyers who receive client money must not 
commingle those funds with money belonging to the lawyer.7 
Most issues of professional responsibility, however, are not governed by 
clear rules.  Instead, lawyers possess “discretion” on how to resolve these 
issues.  I use the term “discretion” loosely to refer to a relative degree of 
freedom to decide how to act, as opposed to decisions based on specific rules.8  
A distinction should be drawn between two forms of discretion.  Sometimes 
lawyers have “broad discretion,” discretion that is unrestricted by a standard.  
Lawyers’ choices of areas of practice and the amount of pro bono work they 
decide to do are examples.  In other situations, lawyers have “restricted 
discretion,” limited or “grounded” in a general standard.9  The conflict of 
interest rules provide an example.10 
It is not my purpose in this article to examine the exercise of discretion by 
lawyers in depth.  A more nuanced analysis of discretion must take into 
account the institutional structure in which lawyers practice.11  Some law firms 
have an institutional commitment to pro bono activities by members of the 
firm.  By contrast, other firms, either formally or informally, may discourage 
pro bono activities.  Lawyers who practice in such firms do not have broad 
discretion regarding pro bono participation even though the rules of the 
profession may grant them such discretion. 
It is also not my purpose here to catalogue and characterize all of the 
discretionary decisions that lawyers face.  However, discussion of a few 
examples of lawyer discretion is worthwhile to establish the pedagogical need 
for assisting students in dealing with these decisions.12 
 
 6. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (2007). 
 7. Id. at R. 1.15(a). 
 8. The modern critique of legal formalism has called into question the proposition that rules 
can ever determine results.  See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 468 (1990).  The validity of this critique is not essential, however, to my argument.  If the 
critique is correct in whole or in part, then lawyers have an even broader area of discretion than 
described in this article.  If the critique is false, lawyers nonetheless have a substantial degree of 
discretion, particularly with regard to important ethical decisions. 
 9. Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 37–38 (1997) (distinguishing between different types of discretion). 
 10. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2007) (dealing with concurrent conflicts 
of interest); id. at R. 1.9 (dealing with former client conflicts of interest); see also infra Part II.B. 
 11. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665 
(1994). 
 12. For other examples, see Crystal, Developing a Philosophy of Lawyering, supra note 2, at 
76–84 (2000). 
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A. Confidentiality 
Model Rule 1.6 governs the scope of a lawyer’s ethical duty of 
confidentiality.13  The rule broadly prohibits lawyers from revealing any 
information relating to the representation of a client, subject to certain 
exceptions.14  Several of the exceptions deal with disclosure of confidential 
information to prevent or to rectify wrongdoing by a client.15  In almost all 
situations, however, the lawyer’s decision whether to disclose confidential 
information is discretionary with the lawyer.  Comment 15 explains: 
Paragraph (b) permits but does not require the disclosure of information 
relating to a client’s representation to accomplish the purposes specified in 
paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(6).  In exercising the discretion conferred by this 
Rule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the nature of the lawyer’s 
relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, 
the lawyer’s own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate 
the conduct in question.  A lawyer’s decision not to disclose as permitted by 
paragraph (b) does not violate this Rule.16 
B. Conflicts of Interest 
Model Rule 1.7 provides standards for lawyers to use in deciding whether 
they face a concurrent conflict of interest and, if so, whether the conflict is 
consentable by the affected clients.17  Common examples include 
representation of multiple plaintiffs or defendants in civil cases, representation 
of co-defendants in criminal cases, and representation of multiple clients in 
business ventures.18  The Rule provides lawyers with restricted or grounded 
discretion19 to decide whether to undertake representation involving a 
concurrent conflict.20  The Rule leaves lawyers with broad discretion whether 
to accept representation that does not involve a conflict under the Rule.21  For 
example, if it is ethically permissible for a lawyer to undertake representation 
 
 13. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007). 
 14. Id. at R. 1.6 cmt. 15. 
 15. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(1)–(3). 
 16. Id. at R. 1.6 cmt. 15.  The comment goes on to state that other rules may require 
disclosure, for example Model Rule 3.3(c) requires lawyers to reveal false testimony that has 
been offered by the lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer.  Id. at R. 3.3(c). 
 17. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2007). 
 18. For an examination of the ethical propriety of multiple representation in these situations, 
see CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 294–323 (2004) (discussing 
multiple plaintiffs or defendants in civil cases); id. at 139–53 (discussing multiple representation 
of co-defendants in criminal cases); id. at 461–73 (discussing multiple representation in business 
ventures). 
 19. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
 20. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2007). 
 21. Id. 
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of multiple clients in a business venture, should a lawyer exercise his 
discretion to do so, or should the lawyer only agree to represent one of the 
parties?  Given the risks of multiple representation in criminal cases, should a 
lawyer ever exercise her discretion to represent multiple clients in a criminal 
case?  How does a lawyer go about making these discretionary decisions?  The 
rules of ethics provide almost no guidance. 
C. Limitations on Zealous Representation 
A number of rules act as limitations on zealous representation.  These rules 
can be broadly justified on utilitarian grounds—if the interest of the system of 
justice or of third parties in being free of certain conduct outweighs the interest 
of the client in having the lawyer engage in the conduct, the conduct should be 
prohibited or regulated in some fashion.22  Some rules limiting zealous 
representation are nondiscretionary.  Thus, Model Rule 4.2 prohibits a lawyer 
from communicating with a person who is represented by counsel in the matter 
about the subject matter of the representation without the consent of that 
person’s lawyer unless the communication is authorized by law.23 
Other rules provide lawyers with broad discretion. When the ABA 
amended the Model Rules in 2002, it added Rule 4.4(b) and its accompanying 
comments to deal with the problem of misdirected communications and 
inadvertently produced documents.24  Rule 4.4(b) requires a lawyer to notify 
the sender if the lawyer receives a document and either knows or reasonably 
should know that the document was inadvertently produced.25  The comments, 
however, go on to provide lawyers with broad discretion regarding other steps 
to take: 
Some lawyers may choose to return a document unread, for example, when the 
lawyer learns before receiving the document that it was inadvertently sent to 
the wrong address.  Where a lawyer is not required by applicable law to do so, 
the decision to voluntarily return such a document is a matter of professional 
judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer.  See Rules 1.2 and 1.4.26 
III.  THE NEED FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF LAWYERING 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not provide answers to 
lawyers on how to resolve the discretionary decisions they face related to the 
practice of law.  In many instances, such as choice of practice area, the Model 
Rules are completely silent.  In situations in which the Model Rules speak, 
they often provide lawyers with broad or restricted discretion on how to act. 
 
 22. See CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 337–460. 
 23. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2007). 
 24. See id. at R. 4.4(b). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. at R. 4.4 cmt. 3. 
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I use the term “philosophy of lawyering” to mean a principle-based 
approach that lawyers can use to resolve the wide range of discretionary 
decisions that they will face related to the practice of law.  As discussed above, 
issues of professional responsibility arise at three interrelated dimensions—the 
personal, the practice, and the professional.27  At the personal dimension 
lawyers must decide the relationship between their personal and family lives 
and their work.  Some lawyers may decide that the personal side of their life is 
primary while work is secondary.  Others may strive for a balance between 
personal life and work.  However, some may decide to dedicate themselves to 
their professional careers, either sacrificing or largely eliminating a personal 
life. 
Chart 1: Relationship Between Personal Life and Practice 
Personal Life Primary Balanced Life Practice Primary 
   The relationship between a lawyer’s personal life and practice life does 
not necessarily remain static.  Early in their careers some lawyers may make 
their commitments to practice primary, but this commitment may change if 
they marry or have children, as they age, or as they face the various 
vicissitudes of life.  The categories I describe are, of course, to some degree 
subjective.  What one lawyer views as a balanced life may be considered to be 
devotion to practice by another lawyer.  Each lawyer must decide for himself 
or herself what these terms mean; each lawyer should listen to the views of 
family, friends, and colleagues to determine whether the lawyer’s self-
perceptions are accurate.  My goal here is to help lawyers, especially young 
lawyers, think hard about the relationship between their personal and their 
practice lives and to offer a framework and terminology for considering that 
relationship. 
At the professional dimension, some lawyers may choose to largely 
remove themselves from involvement in professional or community activities, 
such as service on bar committees, pro bono work, or community participation.  
Other lawyers may decide to dedicate a substantial amount of their time to 
professional work.  Still others may be involved in professional activities to a 
significant degree, but not to the level of those who are dedicated to such 
efforts. 
 
 27. See supra Part I. 
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Chart 2: Degree of Involvement in Professional Activities 
Removed Involved Dedicated 
Once again, these terms are subjective—to be personally defined by each 
lawyer, taking into account the views of significant others. 
Most courses on professional responsibility devote the vast majority of 
their time to issues in the practice dimension—lawyer-client relations, 
confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and so on.  I use the term “philosophy of 
practice” to refer to that part of a lawyer’s overall philosophy of lawyering that 
focuses on the lawyer’s philosophy in making discretionary decisions in the 
practice dimension.  The literature on professional responsibility has developed 
a number of approaches to guide lawyers in making practice decisions.28  The 
traditional approach to resolving questions of professional ethics when the 
rules are unclear could be labeled a client-centered philosophy.  Under a client-
centered approach, lawyers must take any action that will advance the client’s 
interest so long as the action does not clearly violate a rule of ethics or other 
law (the principle of professionalism).29  Moreover, lawyers are not morally 
accountable for any actions that they take on behalf of clients in their 
professional role (the principle of nonaccountability).30  Professor William 
Simon, one of the leading critics of client-centered lawyering, has 
characterized this philosophy as an “ideology of advocacy,” involving two 
principles of conduct—neutrality and partisanship.31  Following Simon, many 
writers now use the term “neutral partisanship” to refer to the standard 
conception of the lawyer’s role.  A more colloquial way of putting these ideas 
is that lawyers are “hired guns.” 
Critics of neutral partisanship have argued that a client-centered 
philosophy is morally unsound because it requires lawyers, in the course of 
representing clients, to engage in conduct that violates conventional morality.32  
 
 28. In this article I provide only a sketch of broad themes.  The literature is rich and deep.  
For a more extensive discussion, see CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 
20–32. 
 29. Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. 
REV. 669, 673 (1978) [hereinafter Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of 
Lawyers]; Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543, 
544 (1983) [hereinafter Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate]. 
 30. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, supra note 29, at 673; 
Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, supra note 29, at 544 (1983); see also DAVID LUBAN, 
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 7 (1988) (relying on Schwartz’s principles as the basis for a normative 
evaluation of the adversary system). 
 31. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional 
Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 36–37 (1978). 
 32. See Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy’s Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 
WIS. L. REV. 1529, 1532–33 (1984).  The moral critique of the role of neutral partisanship is 
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The critics of neutral partisanship have offered an alternative philosophy that 
could be called a philosophy of morality.33  Under this philosophy, lawyers are 
morally accountable for the actions that they take on behalf of their clients and 
must be prepared to defend the morality of what they do.  Adoption of a 
philosophy of morality has a number of practical lawyering consequences.  
Lawyers would decline representation in more cases than under a client-
centered philosophy, turning down cases in which the lawyers concluded that 
the representation was morally indefensible.34  Lawyers would withdraw from 
representation more frequently, for example, in cases in which clients 
demanded that lawyers pursue goals or tactics that the lawyers found to be 
morally unsound.35  Lawyers would take a broader view of their obligations as 
counselors, at a minimum raising moral issues with their clients and often 
trying to convince their clients to take what the lawyer considered to be the 
morally correct action.36  In situations in which lawyers had professional 
discretion about how to act or in which the rules were unclear, a lawyer acting 
under a philosophy of morality would take the action that the lawyer believed 
to be indicated by principles of morality, even if this action was not necessarily 
in the client’s interest.37 
Other critics of a client-centered philosophy have sought to develop 
approaches based on social or professional values or norms rather than 
principles of morality.  The major advantage of such a philosophy, which 
could be called a philosophy of institutional values, is that norms expressed in 
an institutional form are likely to be seen as more objective and justified than 
moral values, which are often viewed as individual, subjective, and 
controversial.  It should be noted that the philosophies of morality and 
 
developed in ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 90–155 
(1980); LUBAN, supra note 30; Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 
55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980); Simon, supra note 31, at 30; Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as 
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975). 
 33. Probably the most comprehensive development of a philosophy of morality can be found 
in LUBAN, supra note 30.  A number of other scholars have also offered their views on how moral 
values can be incorporated into the lawyer’s role.  See generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT 
F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994). Other 
commentators have focused on the relationship between religious values and lawyering styles.  
See Russell G. Pearce, Foreword: The Religious Lawyering Movement: An Emerging Force in 
Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998). 
 34. LUBAN, supra note 30, at 160. 
 35. Id. at 173–74. 
 36. Id. at 173. 
 37. Id. at 160, 173–74.  For a discussion of the difficulty of incorporating a philosophy of 
morality into the actual practice of lawyers, where morality is often vague and uncertain, see Paul 
R. Tremblay, Moral Activism Manqué, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 127 (2002).  Professor Tremblay has 
argued that lawyers should handle discretionary decisions by employing casuistry, decision-
making based upon comparison of paradigm cases.  Paul R. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, 12 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489, 492 (1999) [hereinafter Tremblay, The New Casuistry]. 
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institutional values are not inconsistent because institutional values often 
embody moral principles. 
The most comprehensive statement of a philosophy of lawyering based on 
institutional values is found in Professor Simon’s work.  He argues for the 
following basic principle: “[T]he lawyer should take such actions as, 
considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to 
promote justice.”38  Simon uses the term “justice” not in some abstract or 
philosophical sense, but rather as equivalent with the “legal merit” of the 
case.39  In deciding the legal merit of the case, the lawyer must exercise 
contextual or discretionary decision-making.40  Simon identifies two 
dimensions to this approach.  First, in deciding whether to represent a client, a 
lawyer should assess the “relative merit” of the client’s claims and goals in 
relation to other clients that the lawyer might serve.41  Simon recognizes that 
financial considerations play a significant role in lawyers’ decisions to 
represent clients, but he calls on lawyers to take into account relative merit in 
addition to financial considerations.42  Second, in the course of representation, 
Simon calls on lawyers to assess the “internal merit” of their clients’ claims.43  
He rejects the view that lawyers should assume responsibility for determining 
the outcome of cases: “Responsibility to justice is not incompatible with 
deference to the general pronouncements or enactments of authoritative 
institutions such as legislatures and courts.  On the contrary, justice often, 
perhaps usually, requires such deference.”44  When procedural defects exist, 
however, the lawyer’s obligation to do justice requires the lawyer to assume 
responsibility for promoting the substantively just outcome: “[T]he more 
reliable the relevant procedures and institutions, the less direct responsibility 
the lawyer need assume for the substantive justice of the resolution; the less 
reliable the procedures and institutions, the more direct responsibility she 
needs to assume for substantive justice.”45 
Professor Brad Wendel has also argued for a philosophy of institutional 
value, which he calls the “authority of the law.”46  A lawyer following this 
 
 38. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 9 (1998). 
 39. Id. at 10. 
 40. Id. at 138–69. 
 41. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1092 
(1988). 
 42. Id. at 1092–93. 
 43. Id. at 1091. 
 44. SIMON, supra note 38, at 138; see also Simon, supra note 41, at 1096–97. 
 45. SIMON, supra note 38, at 140; see also Simon, supra note 41, at 1097–98.  While 
Professor Simon focuses on decision-making by lawyers, Professor Deborah Rhode has argued 
for structural change in the legal profession to promote justice.  See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE 
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000). 
 46. See W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (2004) [hereinafter 
Wendel, Civil Disobedience]; see also W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of 
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approach accepts that he or she is a quasi-public official who has an obligation 
to show respect for the law rather than to treat the law instrumentally or 
override the law because of the lawyer’s own view of morality.47  Under this 
approach, if an uncertain issue arises, the lawyer would ask which 
interpretation appears to be the best, most persuasive legal analysis of the 
issue, and would follow this conclusion unless the lawyer decides to engage in 
civil disobedience and accepts the consequences.48 
Other scholars have sought to ground an institutional philosophy in the 
norms of the legal profession.  Professor Timothy Terrell and Mr. James 
Wildman examine factors that have caused a crisis of professionalism for 
lawyers.49  They argue that the true foundation of professionalism must be 
found in a commitment to the rule of law.50  Terrell and Wildman identify six 
values that they believe lie at the core of professionalism: 
 An ethic of excellence 
 An ethic of integrity; a responsibility to say “no” 
 A respect for the system and rule of law; a responsibility to say 
“why” 
 A respect for other lawyers and their work 
 A commitment to accountability 
 A responsibility for adequate distribution of legal services51 
Any discussion of philosophies of practice would be incomplete if it did 
not take into account the fact that lawyers’ own interests and values profoundly 
affect their views of practice.  Many discretionary decisions that lawyers face 
can have substantial economic consequences.  For example, how aggressively 
should a lawyer counsel a client to accept a settlement that the lawyer believes 
to be desirable but which the client is reluctant to accept?  Other discretionary 
decisions can involve the risk of professional discipline or damage to the 
 
Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 75–85 (2005) (criticizing lawyers in the Office of 
Legal Counsel of the Justice Department who drafted the “torture memos” for failing to respect 
the law). 
 47. Wendel, Civil Disobedience, supra note 46, at 382–88. 
 48. Id. at 403–05; see also W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional 
Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 7 (1999) (arguing for a set of public values of 
lawyering derived from the “social function of lawyers and from the traditions and practices of 
the legal profession”). 
 49. Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking “Professionalism”, 41 EMORY L.J. 
403 (1992). 
 50. Id. at 423. 
 51. Id. at 424–31; see also Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 
49 MD. L. REV. 255 (1990) (advocating a vision of law as a public profession and describing 
ways in which lawyers could implement that ideal in the conditions of modern practice); Fred C. 
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 21 
(2005) (arguing that lawyers should exercise “professional conscience” rather than engaging in 
neutral partisanship or exercising personal moral judgments). 
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lawyer’s reputation.  Some lawyers may choose to adopt a philosophy of acting 
in their own interest when confronted with discretionary decisions. 
Chart 3: Philosophies of Practice 
Lawyer Self 
Interest 
Client Centered Morality Institutional 
Value 
 These four categories are not meant to be exclusive.  Lawyers could 
articulate and defend more complex philosophies of practice that combine the 
features of several philosophies.  For example, some scholars have challenged 
the claim that neutral partisanship accurately describes the behavior of most 
lawyers.52  Professors Stephen Ellmann and Ted Schneyer argue that the rules 
of ethics already grant lawyers considerable discretion to take into account 
moral considerations in their representation: “Lawyers have considerable 
freedom to reject cases, to limit their representation so as to exclude repugnant 
objectives or tactics, and to urge their own moral views upon clients whether 
or not the clients have requested such enlightenment.”53  In particular, Model 
Rule 2.1 states that in giving advice to their clients, lawyers “may refer not 
only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and 
political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation,”54 and Model 
Rule 1.16(b)(4) allows lawyers to withdraw when “the client insists upon 
taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has 
a fundamental disagreement.”55  Some lawyers might, therefore, choose to 
employ what could be called a modified client-centered approach.  Under this 
approach lawyers would normally act as neutral partisans, but in unusual or 
rare cases lawyers would turn to moral values either in their counseling role or 
in their decision whether to continue the representation. 
 
 52. See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 116 (1990) (reviewing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE (1988)); Schneyer, supra 
note 32, at 1544–50. 
 53. Ellmann, supra note 52, at 121; see also Schneyer, supra note 32, at 1564–66; cf. Fred 
C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303 
(1995).  Professor Fred Zacharias agrees that the Code and the Model Rules authorize lawyers to 
incorporate moral factors in their representation of clients, but he argues that the ethos of the 
practice has developed to limit the exercise of objective judgment.  He proposes a number of 
institutional changes that can help reintroduce objectivity into the lawyer’s role.  Id. 
 54. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2007). 
 55. Id. at R. 1.16(b)(4). 
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The following chart combines the discussion of approaches to each of the 
dimensions of professional responsibility. 
Chart 4: Possible Philosophies of Lawyering 
Dimension Philosophy Philosophy Philosophy Philosophy 
Personal  Personal Life 
Primary 
Balanced Committed to 
Work 
 




Moral Values Institutional 
Values 
Professional   Removed Involved Dedicated  
This approach provides students with a framework for characterizing, 
comparing, and ultimately evaluating the philosophies of lawyering of lawyers 
that the students encounter or observe.  For example, in a summer clerkship a 
student might experience two lawyers with quite different philosophies.  One 
lawyer’s philosophy might involve a balanced personal/work life, client-
centered lawyering, and dedication to professional involvement.  Another 
lawyer might be committed to his work, self interested in his practice 
philosophy, and removed from professional activities. 
Philosophies of lawyering provide lawyers with a set of values they can 
use in deciding how to act when confronted with discretionary decisions, but 
they are not specific enough to help a lawyer in choosing among several 
alternative courses of action all of which appear to be consistent with the 
lawyer’s general philosophy.  For example, suppose a lawyer has adopted a 
client-centered philosophy.  Suppose the lawyer is representing a client in a 
litigation matter, and the opposing side inadvertently produces documents that 
may be privileged.56  The client-centered philosophy directs the lawyer to act 
in a way that maximizes the client’s interests,57 but what are the client’s 
interests and what course of action maximizes those interests?  In order to 
assist the lawyer in making specific decisions, a general philosophy of 
lawyering must be supplemented by practical reasoning.58  Practical reasoning 
requires the lawyer to identify the options available (consistent with the 
lawyer’s general philosophy) for dealing with the decision that must be made, 
to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of each option, and to choose (or 
 
 56. For a discussion of this issue, see CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 
2, at 364–72 (Problem 4-3). 
 57. See supra p. 1241. 
 58. See R. Jay Wallace, Practical Reason, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 
2003, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/practical-reason/. 
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to assist the client in choosing) the option that appears to maximize the net 
benefits or minimize the net costs.59 
I turn now to how this framework can be incorporated into teaching 
professional responsibility. 
IV.  INCORPORATING THE CONCEPT OF A PHILOSOPHY OF LAWYERING INTO 
TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Essential to the development of a philosophy of lawyering is the exercise 
of sound professional judgment in making decisions.  David Luban and 
Michael Millemann have argued that development of professional judgment 
requires active participation by students in making decisions under the tutelage 
of a mentor who possesses good judgment.60  The student’s involvement can 
take either of two forms: (1) trial and error by the student subject to criticism 
by the mentor or (2) demonstration by the mentor in which the student imitates 
the mentor’s exercise of judgment.61  Luban, Millemann, and other scholars 
argue that instruction in sound judgment can be best presented in a clinical 
setting, where the student must make real-life decisions.62 
While I agree that clinical courses offer an excellent opportunity to discuss 
issues of professional responsibility and to help students in developing sound 
judgment,63 I also think that clinical courses have severe limitations.  First, in 
the vast majority of law schools, professional responsibility is taught primarily, 
if not exclusively, in traditional rather than clinical classes.  To leave 
instruction in professional judgment to clinical courses risks ignoring 
development of this fundamental professional attribute for most law students.  
Second, in clinical courses students typically handle relatively few matters.64  
The issues of professional judgment that arise are limited in number.  If the 
clinical course includes a seminar on professional responsibility, the instructor 
can use the experiences of the class to broaden the areas of judgment discussed 
in the course, but nonetheless the treatment of judgment remains limited by the 
experiences of the students.  For these reasons, in my opinion, it is important 
that traditional courses on professional responsibility find ways of 
incorporating development of professional judgment into their fabric.  In the 
remainder of this article I offer ways in which this can be done through: (1) 
student papers, which can take a wide variety of forms, (2) problems that 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 59 (1995). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 64–66; see also Tremblay, The New Casuistry, supra note 37, at 512–41. 
 63. For several years I taught a professional responsibility course that was integrated with 
clinical courses at the University of South Carolina. 
 64. Deborah Jones Merritt & Jennifer Cihon, New Course Offerings in the Upper-Level 
Curriculum: Report of an AALS Survey, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 524, 536 (1997). 
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require students to exercise professional judgment, (3) analysis of cases in 
which the decisions of the lawyers are subject to critical scrutiny, and (4) 
alternative methodologies to demonstrate and evaluate the exercise of 
professional judgment. 
A. Student Papers 
Papers provide an excellent vehicle for students to observe the decision-
making of other lawyers, to critically evaluate their decisions, and to determine 
whether the philosophy of the lawyer being observed is compatible with the 
student’s values.  If the instructor is teaching a seminar on professional 
responsibility, at least one paper is usually a standard requirement.  It would be 
quite easy, therefore, to have one of the papers focus on development of a 
philosophy of lawyering.  Even in large courses, the instructors could assign a 
paper to help students develop their own philosophy of lawyering.  In my 
course on professional responsibility, which typically has sixty to eighty 
students, I often offer students the option of doing a one or two-hour extra 
credit paper on the development of a philosophy of lawyering.  On occasion, I 
have required all students in the course to write a paper, which counts for one-
third of their grade in a three-credit course.  My experience has been that 
students understand the importance of this project to their professional 
development and do not find the requirement either unreasonable or 
burdensome. 
Many types of papers can be assigned to assist students in developing a 
philosophy of lawyering.  I discuss three: lawyer interview papers, lawyer 
biography papers, and leading scholar papers. 
1. Lawyer Interview Papers 
My first choice for a student paper would be the lawyer interview paper.  
The lawyer interview paper enables students to examine the actual decisions 
that a lawyer has made covering the full range of choices related to the practice 
of law, including personal, practice, and professional decisions.  In this article I 
discuss a number of other ways in which students can begin to develop a 
philosophy of lawyering, but many of these other approaches present only a 
partial picture of the lawyer’s philosophy, typically the lawyer’s philosophy of 
practice.65  Ideally, the lawyer the student selects for the interview will be a 
lawyer that the student knows and admires—for example, a friend, family 
member, or employer.  If the instructor’s school has an organized program in 
which members of the bar mentor students, that program provides another way 
in which students can select interviewees. 
 
 65. A paper on the lawyering philosophy of a lawyer who is the subject of a biography or 
autobiography can also offer the possibility of examining a complete philosophy of lawyering, 
depending on the scope of the biography or autobiography.  See infra pp. 1250–51. 
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Here are possible instructions for a lawyer interview paper: 
Instructions for Lawyer Interview Paper 
  One way to begin thinking about developing a philosophy of lawyering is 
to look for role models.  The goal of the lawyer interview paper is for you to 
start to think systematically about the various discretionary decisions you will 
face in connection with the practice of law, to learn how your interviewee 
approached a number of these decisions, and to critically evaluate the decisions 
that the interviewee made to see whether they could provide a satisfactory 
model for you in the practice of law. 
  1. Selection of interviewee.  You may choose any lawyer admitted to 
practice as the subject of your interview.  The interviewee may be a family 
member, friend, employer, or mentor assigned to you by the school’s 
mentoring program.  If you have difficulty selecting an interviewee, please let 
me know.  If either you or the interviewee would prefer that the interviewee 
remain anonymous, you may eliminate the lawyer’s name and other personal 
identifying information from the paper.  You should provide the interviewee 
with the attached information sheet about the project. 
  2. Purpose of interview.  The purpose of the interview is for you to gather 
detailed information from the interviewee about specific decisions that the 
lawyer has faced related to the practice of law.  You will then use this 
information to describe and reflect on the lawyer’s philosophy of lawyering.  
To the extent permitted by rules of confidentiality,66 ask your interviewee to 
identify specific issues of professional responsibility that the interviewee 
encountered, to explain why the issue was difficult, and to discuss how the 
interviewee resolved the issue and why.67  Your interview and paper should 
discuss a broad range of specific issues, such as the following: 
 choosing a type of practice 
 deciding to take or decline cases 
 counseling a client regarding the exercise of the client’s legal rights 
 exercising strategic or tactical judgment on behalf of a client (e.g., 
deciding whether to call or to cross-examine a witness) 
 withdrawing from representation because the lawyer concludes that the 
client is acting immorally 
 preventing the client from doing harm to others (e.g., disclosing the 
client’s intention to commit a wrongful act) 
 acting on behalf of a client in ways that will harm others 
 participating in pro bono, law reform, and other professional activities to 
improve the law 
 
 66. The instructor should draft a letter or set of instructions that students can give to 
interviewees with regard to confidentiality. 
 67. It is possible that a student interview may identify a possible violation of the rules of 
professional conduct by the interviewee.  Depending on the circumstances, the instructor may 
have a duty to report the violation to appropriate disciplinary authorities.  See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2007). 
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  3. Paper.  The paper should be fifteen to twenty pages, double spaced with 
1 inch margins.  The paper should be organized as follows: 
Summary of paper 
I. Description of Lawyer.  Description of interviewee’s childhood, age, 
academic background, practice experience, nature of practice, etc. 
II. Interview.  Discussion of specific decisions related to the practice of law 
that the lawyer has faced, the decisions the lawyer made, the basis of each 
decision, and the lawyer’s evaluation of those decisions. 
III. Description of the Lawyer’s Philosophy of Lawyering.  Based on your 
interview and the material we have discussed about philosophies of lawyering, 
describe the philosophy used by your interviewee.  What is the relationship 
between the interviewee’s personal and family life and his or her work?  What 
approach or approaches has the lawyer used in dealing with difficult questions 
of professional responsibility that he or she has faced in practice?  To what 
professional or institutional activities does the lawyer devote his or her time? 
What principles inform the lawyer’s thinking about these issues?  You should 
not expect your interviewee to follow one of the pure types of philosophies that 
we have discussed in the course.  Your interviewee, like many lawyers, may 
adopt a philosophy that modifies in significant respects one of the types that 
we have considered. 
IV. Analysis and Conclusion.  Analyze what you think are the strengths and 
weaknesses of your interviewee’s philosophy of lawyering and the extent to 
which you would follow such a philosophy in the practice of law. 
2. Lawyer Biography Papers 
Instead of interviewing a practicing lawyer, students can write a paper on 
the philosophy of lawyering of a lawyer reflected in a biography or 
autobiography.  Instructors can suggest a number of possible subjects for such 
a paper, for example: 
 CLARK M. CLIFFORD, COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT: A MEMOIR 
(1991)  
 JOHNNIE L. COCHRAN WITH TIM RUTTEN, JOURNEY TO JUSTICE 
(1996) 
 MORRIS DEES, A LAWYER’S JOURNEY: THE MORRIS DEES STORY 
(2001) 
 WILLIAM HENRY HARBAUGH, LAWYER’S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF 
JOHN W. DAVIS (1973) 
 LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS (1990) 
 WILLIAM M. KUNTSLER WITH SHEILA EISENBERG, A MAN OF THE 
SIXTIES: MY LIFE AS A RADICAL LAWYER (1994) 
 ARTHUR L. LIMAN WITH PETER ISRAEL, LAWYER: A LIFE OF 
COUNSEL AND CONTROVERSY (1998) 
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 ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 
(1946) 
 LOUIS NIZER, REFLECTIONS WITHOUT MIRRORS: AN 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE MIND (1978) 
 VICTOR RABINOWITZ, UNREPENTANT LEFTIST (1996) 
 MARY BETH ROGERS, BARBARA JORDAN: AMERICAN HERO 
(1998) 
 GERRY SPENCE, THE MAKING OF A COUNTRY LAWYER (1996) 
 EVAN THOMAS, THE MAN TO SEE: EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS 
(1991) 
 KEVIN TIERNEY, DARROW: A BIOGRAPHY (1979) 
 MICHAEL E. TIGAR, FIGHTING INJUSTICE (2002) 
 LAWRENCE E. WALSH, THE GIFT OF INSECURITY: A LAWYER’S 
LIFE (2003) 
 JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN 
REVOLUTIONARY (1998) 
In writing the paper, students can be directed to consider the following 
questions:  (1) What were the major decisions that the lawyer faced during the 
lawyer’s career?  (2) What decisions did the lawyer make?  (3) What values 
were the basis of these decisions?  (4) Based on your review of the lawyer’s 
decision-making, how would you describe the lawyer’s philosophy of 
lawyering?  (5) Critically evaluate the lawyer’s philosophy of lawyering and 
explain whether the lawyer’s philosophy is acceptable to you. 
3. Leading Scholar Papers 
During the last twenty-five years, a number of scholars have argued 
forcefully for different philosophies of lawyering.68  Students could be 
assigned to write a paper on the philosophy of lawyering of a scholar who has 
written extensively on these issues.  The paper would involve a literature 
review of the scholar’s work as it relates to the concept of a philosophy of 
lawyering, description and analysis of how the scholar’s approach would 
resolve specific issues of professional responsibility, and critical evaluation of 
whether the student finds the scholar’s approach compatible with the student’s 
values.  It is quite easy to prepare an extensive list of scholars who could be the 
subject of such a paper. 
V.  ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS 
Instructors of professional responsibility commonly use the problem 
method.69  Problems can be used to teach the substantive issues raised by the 
problem, but they can also be used to help students to develop their own 
 
 68. See supra notes 28–55 and accompanying text. 
 69. Thomas D. Morgan, Use of the Problem Method for Teaching Legal Ethics, 39 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 409, 411 (1998). 
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philosophy of lawyering, particularly to develop their philosophy of practice.  I 
offer as an example of how this can be done in one of the problems from my 
book on professional responsibility: 
Problem 1-2 Reporting Misconduct by Another Lawyer 
  You are the only associate recently hired by a solo practitioner, Norman 
Wilson.  You were hired about a year ago after a lengthy job search.  You feel 
extremely fortunate to have the job because the market for lawyers in your area 
has been very tight; a number of your classmates still do not have a position. 
  One of the matters on which you have worked is Sylvia v. United Truck 
Lines, an automobile accident case in which the firm represented the plaintiff, 
Sylvia.  The case settled about a month ago for $250,000, and the file was 
closed.  You did some legal research on the case and met with the client on 
several occasions regarding discovery issues.  You did not participate in 
settlement negotiations or in disbursement of settlement funds. 
  Recently, you came across a research memo that you did in Sylvia v. 
United Truck Lines that was misfiled.  You pulled the file of the Sylvia case 
from the firm’s closed files.  As you were putting the research memo into the 
file, you happened to notice the closing statement in the case. 
  The statement signed by the client showed a structured settlement in which 
$100,000 was paid immediately and $25,000 payable over each of the next six 
years.  The statement also showed that the firm’s one-third attorney fee was 
paid fully out of the initial payment.  Thus, the client only received about 
$17,000 now.  The closing statement struck you as strange because you were 
sure that the case had been settled for a lump sum.  As you thumbed through 
the file, you found a letter from the insurance company stating that it was 
enclosing its draft in the amount of $250,000 as lump sum settlement of the 
case, along with its standard form general release.  You are mystified about 
this and unsure how to proceed.  What should you do?  Read Model Rules 1.6, 
5.2, 8.3 and comments.70 
Substantively, this problem raises a number of issues about the scope and 
exceptions to the duty to report misconduct by another lawyer under ABA 
Model Rule 8.3(a),71 the scope and exceptions to the duty of confidentiality 
under Model Rule 1.6,72 and the duty of subordinate lawyers under Model Rule 
5.2.73  However, I also use this problem (and many others in my book) to teach 
students about the importance of developing a philosophy of lawyering, more 
 
 70. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 36–37. 
 71. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2007). 
 72. Id. at R. 1.6. 
 73. Id. at R. 5.2. 
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particularly a philosophy of practice to deal with difficult, uncertain questions 
of professional responsibility.74 
I begin the discussion by asking a student to take on the role of the 
associate and to identify the nature of the problem the associate faces.  The 
associate’s review of the file indicates that the associate’s employer, Norman 
Wilson, may have misappropriated all or a portion of the client’s settlement.  I 
then ask whether the associate has a duty to report Wilson to the appropriate 
disciplinary authority.  This question has a substantive purpose: to focus on the 
limitations to the duty to report under Model Rule 8.3(a).  Based on the facts 
given, for at least two reasons it seems reasonably clear that the associate does 
not have a duty to report now.  First, while the associate has suspicions that 
Wilson has misappropriated client funds, the associate does not “know” that 
this misconduct has occurred.75  In addition, the associate’s information about 
Wilson’s possible misconduct relates to the representation of Sylvia and is 
therefore subject to the duty of confidentiality under Model Rule 1.6.76  Under 
Model Rule 8.3(c), unless an exception to the duty applies, the associate cannot 
report without Sylvia’s consent.77 
Assuming that the associate does not have a duty to report Wilson’s 
conduct, I then ask a student whether the associate has a duty to investigate 
further to determine whether Wilson has misappropriated Sylvia’s settlement.  
While the Model Rules impose a duty on lawyers to report serious misconduct 
by another lawyer when the lawyer “knows” of the wrongdoing, there is no 
specific rule requiring a lawyer to investigate when the lawyer has serious 
suspicions rather than actual knowledge of wrongdoing by another lawyer.78  
Thus, the associate’s decision whether to investigate is a matter of professional 
discretion.  Students can then be asked what guidance each of the philosophies 
of practice would offer to them in deciding whether to investigate. 
Under a client-centered philosophy, a lawyer should engage in any and all 
actions that will advance the client’s interests so long as the action does not 
violate a clear rule of professional conduct or other law.79  Thus, a client-
centered philosophy would guide the associate to investigate further to 
determine whether Wilson misappropriated Sylvia’s funds.  A philosophy of 
morality indicates that when lawyers have discretion as to how to act, they 
should act in accordance with principles of conventional morality.  Honesty 
and respect for the property rights of others are basic principles of morality.  If 
 
 74. For a complete discussion of how I teach this problem and other problems in my book, 
see NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, TEACHER’S MANUAL TO PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS 
OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION (3d ed. 2004). 
 75. See CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 39–40. 
 76. Id. at 40. 
 77. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(c) (2007). 
 78. See CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 39–40. 
 79. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
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Wilson has misappropriated Sylvia’s funds, he has violated both of these 
principles. Thus, a philosophy of morality also directs the associate to 
investigate further into Wilson’s conduct. 
Application of a philosophy of institutional value is somewhat more 
complex because scholars have advanced several different philosophies that 
fall under this general classification.  Thus, either the instructor or the student 
must select one or more approaches in order to apply this philosophy.  For 
example, under Professor Simon’s approach, when a procedural defect exists, a 
lawyer must assume greater responsibility to achieve a substantively just 
outcome.80  When a lawyer turns against a client, a procedural defect obviously 
exists. Thus, Simon’s approach appears to call for further inquiry by the 
associate.  Similarly, the professionalism approach of Terrell and Wildman 
seems to require further action.81 
Under a philosophy of lawyer self-interest, the associate would act or 
refrain from acting in a way to promote the associate’s own self-interest.  The 
philosophy of lawyer self interest would often direct the lawyer to engage in 
“defensive lawyering,” taking steps that minimize the risk that the lawyer 
would be subject to professional discipline, liability for malpractice, loss of fee 
or other economic loss, or damage to reputation.  Investigation by the associate 
of Wilson’s conduct is unlikely to promote the associate’s interest.  If the 
associate is correct in his or her suspicions that Wilson has engaged in 
wrongdoing, bringing this conduct to light may result in the associate’s loss of 
a job.  Indeed, in two of the leading cases dealing with reporting of 
misconduct, the lawyers were fired.82  If the associate is incorrect in his or her 
suspicions and there is an honest explanation for Wilson’s conduct, the 
associate may receive a kind remark from Wilson for identifying a file error, 
but the possibility of other benefits seem remote.  From the perspective of self-
interest, the associate may be concerned about continuing to work for Wilson if 
he is a crook, but that concern could be addressed by the associate’s beginning 
to look for other job opportunities rather than running the risk associated with 
investigation. 
One or more students can then be asked to explain whether they would 
engage in further investigation of Wilson’s conduct, even though they do not 
have a professional duty to do so, and if so the reasons for their decision.  
Thus, the instructor is asking the students to sharpen their exercise of judgment 
by making a specific decision and by explaining the principles on which that 
decision is based. 
 
 80. See supra text accompanying notes 38–45. 
 81. See supra text accompanying notes 49–51. 
 82. See Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 106 (N.Y. 1992); Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 
S.W.2d 543, 544–45 (Tex. 1998). 
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Assuming that the associate has decided to engage in some further 
investigation of Wilson’s conduct (based on the guidance of a client-centered 
philosophy, a philosophy of morality, a philosophy of institutional value, or 
some other approach), students can then be asked to identify the options they 
have for further investigation.  As discussed above, when confronted with 
alternative courses of action all of which are consistent with a particular 
philosophy, a lawyer must turn to practical reason to make a decision.  
Practical reason requires the lawyer to identify options available for making 
the decision, to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of each option, and 
to select or assist the client in selecting the option that maximizes the net 
benefits or minimizes the net costs involved in the decision.83  Students can be 
asked to identify the options available to them for further investigation of 
Wilson’s conduct.  Consider the following possibilities: 
 Contacting the attorney for the insurance company to verify the 
settlement 
 Contacting the client to verify the settlement or obtain other 
information 
 Discussing the matter with Wilson 
Contacting either the insurance company or the client at this point has 
serious problems.  First, the associate is likely to be asked why the inquiry is 
being made. The associate could not at this point reveal his concern that 
Wilson has misappropriated money, and a lie would be improper.  Second, an 
inquiry to either the insurance company or to the client is likely to be reported 
to Wilson.  This could easily lead to the associate’s losing his or her job, even 
if his suspicions turn out to be correct.  Finally, as a general proposition, it is 
more desirable to deal directly rather than indirectly with a problem.  Thus, at 
this point the best choice seems to be for the associate to raise the issue of the 
settlement in Sylvia with Wilson. 
Assuming that the associate decides to discuss the matter with Wilson, 
another issue of practical reasoning arises.  How should the associate raise the 
matter with Wilson?  Role play of such a meeting provides an excellent vehicle 
for students to develop their skills of practical reasoning. 
Suppose the associate meets with Wilson to discuss the discrepancy 
between the insurance company’s letter and the settlement statement in the 
Sylvia file.  At the meeting Wilson tells the associate that the parties agreed to 
change the settlement; it was converted from a lump sum to a structured 
settlement because the client preferred receiving money over a period of time.  
Wilson says that he returned the insurance company’s draft and received a new 
draft. Wilson expresses surprise that the file does not reflect this.  He says that 
 
 83. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
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he will take care of the matter, and he thanks the associate for bringing the 
matter to his attention. 
Substantively, students can be asked how the associate’s position as a 
subordinate lawyer under Model Rule 5.2 affects the associate’s obligations.  
Rule 5.2(a) states that a subordinate lawyer is personally responsible for 
compliance with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, even though the 
lawyer acted at the direction of another person.84  Thus, the associate cannot 
simply accept Wilson’s explanation.  Model Rule 5.2(b), however, states that a 
subordinate is justified in acting in accordance with a senior lawyer’s 
“reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.”85  Thus, 
the Model Rules emphasize that lawyers have personal responsibility but can 
defer to seniors on doubtful questions.  The situation in Problem 1-2, however, 
does not raise an arguable question of professional duty.  Wilson’s duties are 
clear.  The question is: What happened in Sylvia? 
Students can be asked what actions if any they would take at this point if 
they were the associate.  Once again the question raises an issue of 
professional discretion.  Depending on the student’s philosophy, the student 
could do nothing or investigate further.  The nature of any further investigation 
requires the exercise of practical reason. 
Any problem that requires the exercise of judgment or discretion by the 
student is amenable to the approach that I have described for this problem.  
Further, the methodology that I recommend does not involve a tradeoff or loss 
of substantive coverage.  Instead, substantive coverage and the concept of a 
philosophy of lawyering complement each other.  Substantively, students must 
know the scope and limitations of the rules, but when the rules are unclear or 
do not deal with a particular issue, the guidance of a philosophy of lawyering 
supplemented by practical reasoning is essential. 
VI.  ANALYSIS OF CASES 
I have described how the concept of a philosophy of lawyering 
supplemented by practical reasoning can be used in the problem method.  In 
this section I offer an example of how these ideas may be incorporated into the 
analysis of cases.  I choose as my example the well-known case of Spaulding 
v. Zimmerman.86 
David Spaulding, a passenger in a vehicle driven by John Zimmerman, 
suffered severe head and chest injuries in an automobile accident with another 
vehicle driven by Florian Ledermann and owned by his father, John.87  Two 
 
 84. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.2(a) (2007). 
 85. Id. at R. 5.2(b). 
 86. 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962). 
 87. See Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions: 
Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REV. 63, 63–64 (1998).  Cramton and Knowles 
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individuals were killed in the accident.88  Because Spaulding was a minor (age 
20), the case was brought on his behalf by his father as his natural guardian.89  
Spaulding was represented by a young lawyer, Richard Roberts.90  
Zimmerman’s insurer selected an experienced lawyer, Norman Arveson, to 
represent him.91  Attorney Chester Rosengren represented the Ledermanns and 
their insurer.92 
Three doctors who treated Spaulding failed to discover that he also 
suffered from a life-threatening aneurysm of the aorta that may have been 
caused by the accident.93  Arveson, counsel for Zimmerman, also retained a 
physician, Dr. Hannah, to examine Spaulding.94  Dr. Hannah discovered the 
aneurysm and reported it to Arveson about a week before the case was 
scheduled to go to trial.95  The report stated: 
  The one feature of the case which bothers me more than any other . . . is 
the fact that this boy of 20 years of age has an aneurysm, which means a 
dilatation of the aorta and the arch of the aorta.  Whether this came out of this 
accident I cannot say with any degree of certainty . . . . Of course an aneurysm 
or dilatation of the aorta in a boy of this age is a serious matter as far as his 
life. This aneurysm may dilate further and it might rupture with further 
dilatation and this would cause his death.96 
Roberts never requested a copy of Dr. Hannah’s report.97  The trial court 
later criticized Roberts for his failure “to use available rules of discovery.”98  
Arveson did not inform Zimmerman, Spaulding, or Spaulding’s father about 
the aneurysm.99  Dr. Hannah also did not inform anyone of the situation, other 
than Arveson.100  However, Arveson did make the contents of Dr. Hannah’s 
 
engaged in extensive research into the case to provide a wealth of information not found in the 
reported opinion.  See id. 
 88. Id. at 63. 
 89. Id. at 64. 
 90. Id. at 68. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Cramton & Knowles, supra note 87, at 68. 
 93. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 707–08 (Minn. 1962). Spaulding was 
examined by his family physician, Dr. James Cain, and by two other specialists (an orthopedist 
and a neurologist), who examined him at Dr. Cain’s request.  Id. at 707. 
 94. Id. at 707. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 709. 
 98. Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 709. 
 99. Cramton & Knowles, supra note 87, at 69. 
 100. Id. at 70. 
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report known to Rosengren, the lawyer representing the Ledermanns,101 and it 
appears that Dr. Hannah’s report was also mentioned to one of the insurers.102 
On the day after the case was called for trial, the parties reached a 
settlement calling for a payment to Spaulding of $6,500.103  In connection with 
the settlement negotiations, Arveson was careful not to make any 
representations about the extent of Spaulding’s injuries.104  Roberts then filed a 
petition with the court seeking approval of the settlement, with copy to defense 
counsel.105  Attached to the petition were affidavits from plaintiff’s two 
physicians, but there was no reference to Dr. Hannah’s examination or 
report.106  The petition described Spaulding’s injuries but made no mention of 
the aneurysm.107  The court approved the settlement.108 
Early in 1959, about eighteen months after the settlement was approved, 
Spaulding was required to take a physical examination by the Army 
Reserve.109  He went to Dr. Cain, his family physician, who had originally 
treated him after the accident.110  In the course of this examination, Dr. Cain 
discovered the aneurysm.111  Dr. Cain, after obtaining another opinion, made 
arrangements for surgery.112  While the surgery did remove the aneurysm, 
Spaulding suffered permanent and significant speech loss, probably as a result 
of the procedure.113 
Spaulding then filed a petition to have the settlement vacated and the 
judgment reopened.114  The trial court granted the motion, and the Minnesota 
Supreme Court affirmed.115  The court found that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in reopening the settlement, but this decision was based on 
principles applicable to settlements involving minors rather than on any 
impropriety by defense counsel: 
  The principles applicable to the court’s authority to vacate settlements 
made on behalf of minors and approved by it appear well established.  With 
reference thereto, we have held that the court in its discretion may vacate such 
a settlement, even though it is not induced by fraud or bad faith, where it is 
 
 101. Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 707–08. 
 102. Cramton & Knowles, supra note 87, at 69. 
 103. Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 708. 
 104. Cramton & Knowles, supra note 87, at 70. 
 105. Id. at 71. 
 106. Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 708. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 708. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Cramton & Knowles, supra note 87, at 71. 
 114. Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 708. 
 115. Id. at 711. 
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shown that in the accident the minor sustained separate and distinct injuries 
which were not known or considered by the court at the time settlement was 
approved.116 
  . . . While no canon of ethics or legal obligation may have required 
[defense counsel] to inform plaintiff or his counsel with respect thereto, or to 
advise the court therein, it did become obvious to them at the time that the 
settlement then made did not contemplate or take into consideration the 
disability described.  This fact opened the way for the court to later exercise its 
discretion in vacating the settlement and under the circumstances described we 
cannot say that there was any abuse of discretion on the part of the court in so 
doing. . . .117 
How might discussion of the case be approached with a view to help 
students develop a philosophy of lawyering?  Consider the following possible 
questions that could be posed to the students and analysis of these questions. 
1. Is This a Discretionary Decision? 
Issues regarding the application of a lawyer’s philosophy of lawyering 
only arise if the issue is one involving professional discretion.  Thus, an initial 
issue raised by the facts of Spaulding v. Zimmerman is whether an attorney in 
Arveson’s position today faces a discretionary decision.  Does he or she have a 
legal duty or a professional obligation to inform Roberts of Dr. Hannah’s 
report?  Assuming that the court has rules of procedure similar to the Federal 
Rules, Roberts would be entitled to a copy of Dr. Hannah’s report under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35, but only if Roberts requested the report.118  
Absent such a request, it appears that Arveson would not have a legal duty 
under the rules of discovery to turn over the report. 
What about Arveson’s professional obligations?  Rule 3.3 of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct deals with the lawyer’s obligation of candor to 
the tribunal.119  Rule 3.3(a)(1) provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly 
“make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false 
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the 
lawyer.”120  Arveson might well reason that he has not made a false statement 
 
 116. Id. at 709. 
 117. Id. at 710.  The trial court had also noted that there was “no doubt of the good faith of 
both defendants’ counsel.”  Id. at 709. 
 118. The Rule provides: “If requested by the party against whom an order is made under Rule 
35(a) or the person examined, the party causing the examination to be made shall deliver to the 
requesting party a copy of the detailed written report of the examiner . . . .”  FED. R. CIV. P. 
35(b)(1) (2006).  If defense counsel had listed Dr. Hannah as a testifying expert, Roberts would 
also be entitled to a copy of Dr. Hannah’s report, but Dr. Hannah was not so designated.  See id. 
at 26(a)(2)(B), 26(b)(4). 
 119. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2007). 
 120. Id. at R. 3.3(a)(1). 
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of fact to the tribunal because the petition seeking approval of the settlement 
was filed by Roberts and not signed by Arveson.  The court, however, treated 
the petition as joint because both parties had an interest in having the petition 
approved.121  Thus, the representations of fact in the petition regarding 
Spaulding’s injuries were attributed to defense counsel.  An important lesson 
for students to learn from the court’s treatment of the petition is that lawyers 
should be wary of formalistic reasoning and arguments (“I didn’t sign it, your 
honor”) when thinking about their professional obligations, particularly the 
obligation of candor to the tribunal. 
In addition, the comment to Rule 3.3 indicates that in some situations a 
failure to disclose information can be the equivalent of a misrepresentation: 
“There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent 
of an affirmative misrepresentation.”122  I have argued that lawyers have a duty 
to disclose to the court under Rule 3.3(a)(1) and to opposing counsel under 
Rule 4.1(a) in certain situations, including a situation in which the failure to 
disclose involves a basic fact and violates principles of good faith and fair 
dealing: 
In Spaulding v. Zimmerman, the court held that the settlement agreement was 
subject to rescission, but the court also stated that the lawyers had not acted 
unethically in failing to reveal the information they had about the plaintiff’s 
health.  Under the principles set forth in this Article, the court was wrong in its 
characterization of the lawyers’ conduct.  Under the facts of the case, defense 
counsel’s failure to disclose was the equivalent of a misrepresentation.  
Defense counsel had a duty to disclose because plaintiff’s physical condition 
was a basic fact about which plaintiff was mistaken, and the failure to disclose 
violated principles of good faith and fair dealing.  Indeed, Spaulding is 
probably the clearest case for disclosure that can be imagined because of the 
threat to the plaintiff’s life.  Defense counsel should have immediately 
revealed this information to the plaintiff without the need for consultation with 
their clients.  All of the factors bearing on the issue call for disclosure: the 
harm was serious, the case involved a duty of candor to the court because it 
involved a minor settlement, disclosure would not reveal any sensitive 
information of the defendant, defense counsel’s withdrawal on the eve of trial 
was not feasible and would in any event have simply reaffirmed the problem of 
nondisclosure.  Finally, any sensible philosophy of lawyering must give 
primacy to the value of human life.123 
Under this analysis, it does not matter whether Spaulding was a minor or an 
adult and it does not matter whether a petition was filed with the court or 
 
 121. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 709 (Minn. 1962). 
 122. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 3 (2007). 
 123. Nathan M. Crystal, The Lawyer’s Duty to Disclose Material Facts in Contract or 
Settlement Negotiations, 87 KY. L.J. 1055, 1097–98 (1999); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1), 4.1(a) (2007). 
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whether any court action was pending.  The disclosure obligation applies to 
opposing counsel under Rule 4.1(a).  On this analysis, then, Arveson did not 
face a discretionary decision; he had a professional duty to disclose 
Spaulding’s condition not only to the court, but even earlier to Roberts before 
the settlement was concluded. 
ABA Model Rule 1.6 as amended in 2002 contains a number of exceptions 
to the ethical duty of confidentiality.  Under Rule 1.6(b)(1) a “lawyer may 
reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent reasonably certain death 
or substantial bodily harm . . . .”124  The comments make clear that disclosure 
in this situation is discretionary with the lawyer.125  Whether to make 
disclosure under Rule 1.6 would require the application of the lawyer’s 
philosophy of lawyering. 
In summary, whether a lawyer in Arveson’s position today would have a 
duty to disclose Dr. Hannah’s report to the court or to opposing counsel is 
unclear.  A lawyer could take Spaulding at face value and conclude, as the 
court indicated, that no rule of ethics or legal obligation clearly requires 
disclosure.126  A lawyer could read the case somewhat more broadly to impose 
a duty of disclosure but only in the context of a petition to approve a settlement 
involving a minor.  Still more broadly, a lawyer could accept my analysis of 
the duty of disclosure and conclude that a doctor’s report showing a life 
threatening condition of the opposing party must be disclosed regardless of the 
circumstances.127 
This situation is not uncommon; questions of legal duty are often unclear.  
Instructors could then ask students how application of a philosophy of 
lawyering might help them resolve this uncertainty.  A lawyer applying a 
client-centered philosophy would probably conclude that in case of doubt, 
there is no duty to disclose Dr. Hannah’s report.  The lawyer could still counsel 
the client about disclosure of the report with the client making the decision.128  
A lawyer following a philosophy of morality would probably conclude that a 
duty to disclose exists because saving a life is a fundamental moral value.  A 
lawyer following the philosophy of institutional value advocated by Professor 
Simon would probably conclude that a duty to disclose exists.129  Due to a 
procedural defect—the failure of plaintiff’s lawyer to request a copy of the 
report—defense counsel has a responsibility to promote a substantively just 
outcome.130  Lawyers adhering to a philosophy of self-interest could reach 
 
 124. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2007) (emphasis added). 
 125. Id. at  R. 1.6 cmt. 15. 
 126. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 710 (Minn. 1962). 
 127. See supra text accompanying note 123. 
 128. See infra text accompanying notes 131–40. 
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 38–45. 
 130. See supra notes 37–44, 79, and accompanying text. 
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different outcomes, depending on how they view their own interests.  For 
example, a lawyer who tries to minimize the risk of criticism or legal liability 
would need to decide whether disclosure or preserving confidentially would 
minimize these risks. 
2. Counseling the Clients 
Suppose that a lawyer in Arveson’s position today concludes that he or she 
does not have a legal or professional duty to disclose Dr. Hannah’s report 
either to Roberts or to the court (or at least that the existence of such a duty is 
unclear).  A contemporary Arveson still faces a question about how to handle 
the report.  It appears that defense counsel in the case made the decision not to 
disclose the report to the plaintiff on their own without any consultation with 
the individual defendants or the insurance carriers.131  As discussed below, 
Arveson faces an issue regarding the identity of his client.  However, 
regardless of the client’s identity, it is clear today that Arveson would have a 
professional duty to inform his client or clients of Dr. Hannah’s report132 and 
to render candid advice to his client or clients about the implications of the 
report and how it might be handled.133 
Recognizing that defense counsel has a duty to counsel his client or clients 
regarding the report presents several questions.  In order to carry out this 
obligation the lawyer must identify his or her client.  Who is the client?  The 
defendant Zimmerman?  The insurance company?  Both?  The traditional view 
is that defense counsel employed by an insurance company represents both the 
insured and the insurance company.134  In class this topic could be explored in 
more depth, but for the purpose of this article I will assume that defense 
counsel represents both the defendant and the insurer, in which case the lawyer 
would have an obligation to advise and counsel both regarding the report. 
How should defense counsel advise his clients?  The nature and scope of 
the lawyer’s obligation to counsel is largely a matter of professional discretion 
and judgment.  Model Rule 2.1 states: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall 
exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.  In 
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other 
 
 131. Cramton & Knowles, supra note 87, at 69 (concluding that the “defense lawyers 
probably made the decision not to disclose on their own”). 
 132. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2007) (providing the duty to communicate). 
 133. Id. at R. 2.1; see Cramton & Knowles, supra note 87, at 84–96. 
The most important lesson of Spaulding, then, concerns the lawyer’s counseling role: the 
lawyer must take the client seriously as a person, communicate with and advise the real 
client (not a client stereotype), and engage in a moral dialogue in which lawyer and client 
can learn from each other how to act decently in an unredeemed world. 
Id. at 95–96. 
 134. On the question of whom the lawyer represents in insurance defense practice, see 
CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY, supra note 2, at 310–23. 
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considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may 
be relevant to the client’s situation.”135 Students could be asked how 
application of different philosophies of lawyering would affect the way in 
which they counsel their clients.136 
Under a client-centered philosophy the lawyer should counsel the clients 
about how the report could be handled with a view to maximizing the clients’ 
interests.  But what are the interests of each of the clients?  How can the lawyer 
determine their interests?  The obvious answer is for the lawyer to discuss with 
the clients what their interests are.  Suppose the lawyer meets with the 
defendant and informs the defendant of the medical report and of the plaintiff’s 
lack of knowledge of the contents of the report.  The lawyer can then assist the 
client in deciding the client’s interests with regard to the report.  The lawyer 
can articulate at least two possible client interests with regard to the report.  
One interest is purely economic—handling the report in a way that minimizes 
the client’s possible liability for damages.  With regard to this economic 
interest, the lawyer could explain that disclosure of the report may make it 
more difficult to settle the case because the plaintiff’s demand for damages 
will increase.  This consequence is almost certain to occur.  In addition, 
disclosure of the report could expose the defendant to damages if the plaintiff 
is able to obtain a recovery in excess of the policy limits.  The likelihood of 
this situation occurring depends on the amount of the policy and the 
seriousness of the plaintiff’s injuries.  On the other hand, nondisclosure of the 
report could also result in a long-term economic cost because the defendant 
would be under the cloud of possible reopening of the proceedings.  Further, 
nondisclosure could increase the damages to which the defendant might be 
subject.  If the plaintiff suffers serious injury or dies because his medical 
condition was not disclosed, the plaintiff or his estate might bring suit against 
the defendant for fraudulent nondisclosure, exposing the defendant to actual 
and punitive damages.137  Such damages would almost certainly not be covered 
by insurance.  Another possible interest of the defendant is moral—the interest 
in complying with a moral obligation to inform the plaintiff of a life-
threatening condition.  It is important for students to understand that a client-
centered approach does not require them to assume that their clients are only 
interested in money and have no interest in morally correct behavior.138 
The defendant must decide based on the lawyer’s advice whether he 
recognizes either or both of these interests and, if so, whether disclosure or 
 
 135. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 136. For an elegant description of the discretionary aspects of counseling, see Robert W. 
Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 26–29 (1988). 
 137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(e) (1977) (providing liability for 
nondisclosure). 
 138. Cramton & Knowles, supra note 87, at 94–96. 
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nondisclosure of the report is the best way to maximize those interests.  If the 
defendant recognizes that he has a moral obligation to disclose the plaintiff’s 
condition, the economic analysis becomes irrelevant.  If the defendant does not 
recognize this moral obligation, the defendant may still decide that disclosure 
is in the defendant’s interest for economic reasons. 
Assuming the lawyer has multiple clients, the lawyer must engage in a 
similar counseling session with his other client, the insurance company.  It is 
possible that the clients could be in agreement with regard to how the report 
should be handled.  Under a client-centered philosophy the lawyer would 
follow the clients’ mutual decision even if the lawyer did not necessarily agree 
with their conclusion.  If the clients disagreed, then the lawyer would be forced 
either to withdraw because the clients have directly adverse positions with 
regard to disclosure of the report139 or perhaps inform both clients that they 
need independent representation with regard to their conflict of interest.140 
Suppose the lawyer adheres to a philosophy of morality.  How would the 
lawyer’s handling of the report differ from the way a lawyer who follows a 
client-centered philosophy handles the matter?  Regardless of which 
philosophy the lawyer follows, the lawyer still has an obligation to counsel his 
or her clients.141  However, counseling under a philosophy of morality would 
be quite different from counseling under a client-centered philosophy.  Under 
the client-centered approach the lawyer would assist the clients in determining 
their interests and the best way of effectuating those interests.  Under a 
philosophy of morality the lawyer would determine whether morality requires 
disclosure of the report.  In making this determination the lawyer might rely on 
his or her moral intuition, moral theory, religious values, or other sources of 
moral obligation.142  Just to take one example, Professor Paul Tremblay has 
argued that lawyers should handle discretionary decisions by employing 
casuistry, decision-making based upon comparison of paradigm cases.143  The 
comment to Model Rule 1.6 provides the following example of when a lawyer 
would be permitted to reveal confidential client information to prevent death or 
bodily harm: 
Thus, a lawyer who knows that a client has accidentally discharged toxic waste 
into a town’s water supply may reveal this information to the authorities if 
 
 139. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(3) (2007). 
 140. For a discussion of the ethical obligations of insurance defense counsel when a conflict 
arises between the insurer and the insured, see CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY, supra 
note 2, at 310–23. 
 141. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2007). 
 142. For a discussion of the relationship between lawyers’ personal values and their 
professional obligations, see Green, supra note 9, at 41–51 (discussing the complex question of 
the relationship between a lawyer’s personal or religious values and the lawyer’s professional 
obligation to counsel the client). 
 143. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, supra note 37, at 492. 
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there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will 
contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the lawyer’s disclosure is 
necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the number of victims.144 
To employ the method of casuistry the lawyer would need to identify a 
paradigm case in which disclosure would not be appropriate even though death 
or serious bodily injury could result.  For example, the Restatement provides 
the following example: 
Lawyer advises Manufacturer on product-liability matters.  Lawyer had 
previously advised Manufacturer that use of Component A in a consumer 
product did not create an unreasonable risk of harm and was in compliance 
with consumer-protection and other law.  Lawyer has now learned that 
Supplier, unknown to Manufacturer, provided Component A in a form not in 
compliance with Manufacturer’s specifications.  Manufacturer promptly 
altered its production methods so as to avoid any significant risk of harm in 
products manufactured in the future.  There is a slight statistical chance that a 
consumer using the prior version of the product containing the noncomplying 
version of Component A might suffer serious bodily harm, but only in a highly 
unlikely combination of circumstances.  Manufacturer’s responsible officers 
have decided not to issue a public notice of the slightly increased risk of harm.  
Lawyer does not have discretion under this Section to use or disclose 
Manufacturer’s confidential information to make a public warning of the 
slightly increased risk of harm.145 
Using the method of casuistry a lawyer could compare the features of these 
cases (“triangulation”) and reach a conclusion about whether disclosure would 
be appropriate in a situation like Spaulding v. Zimmerman.146  As Professor 
Tremblay argues, the method of casuistry avoids the necessity of a complex 
understanding of moral theories and of choosing among these theories.147 
If the lawyer decides that morality requires disclosure of the report, as 
appears likely, the lawyer would aggressively counsel the clients of their moral 
obligation to disclose the report.  A lawyer following this philosophy would 
also probably go further.  The lawyer might inform the clients that if the clients 
refused to disclose the report, the lawyer would exercise his professional 
discretion to do so.148  Or, the lawyer might inform the clients that if they 
refused to disclose the report the lawyer would not disclose the report but 
 
 144. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 6 (2007). 
 145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 66, illus. 4 (2000). 
 146. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, supra note 37, at 518. 
 147. Id. at 492. 
 148. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2007) (providing lawyers with 
discretion to reveal confidential information “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial 
bodily harm”). 
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would be forced to withdraw from representation.149  Under a philosophy of 
morality, however, a lawyer could not lie to the clients about their legal 
obligation to disclose the report in order to carry out the lawyer’s conclusion 
that morality requires disclosure.  A lawyer who did so would be engaging in 
morally reprehensible conduct—deception of a client—when the morally 
correct result can be achieved without deceit.  Instructors could ask other 
students to analyze how they would handle their counseling obligations using 
other philosophies of lawyering. 
VII.  OTHER METHODOLOGIES FOR 
TEACHING A PHILOSOPHY OF LAWYERING 
Creative teachers can come up with many other ways in which students 
can begin to develop their own philosophies of lawyering.  Consider the 
following possibilities: 
A. Teacher Demonstrations 
Instructors can demonstrate for students the application of different 
philosophies of lawyering.  For example, an instructor could conduct a mock 
counseling session with a client, role played by a student, based on the facts of 
a problem or case in which the instructor uses one of the philosophies of 
lawyering discussed in the course.  Class discussion after the demonstration 
could focus on justifications for use of the philosophy that the teacher 
employed and the desirability of alternative approaches. 
B. Panel Discussions 
The instructor could invite several lawyers to class for a panel discussion 
moderated by the instructor.  The focus of the panel discussion would be 
similar to that of the lawyer interview paper described above: to identify 
specific issues of professional responsibility that the panel members have 
encountered, to explain why the issue was difficult, and to discuss how the 
panel member resolved the issue and why.150  The instructor can structure the 
discussion to cover a full range of issues at the personal, practice, and 
professional levels.151  The discussion should enable students to observe the 
approaches used by practicing lawyers to resolve difficult, uncertain questions 
of professional responsibility. 
 
 149. See id. at R. 1.16(b)(4) (providing for permissive withdrawal if “the client insists upon 
taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental 
disagreement”). 
 150. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 151. Id. 
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C. Use of Videos and Films 
A number of excellent videos dramatizing issues of professional 
responsibility have been produced.  Instructors could use these videos as the 
basis of class discussion of both substantive issues and of the lawyering 
philosophies adopted by the lawyers portrayed in the video.152  Feature length 
films, such as To Kill a Mockingbird, can also be used to illustrate and critique 
different philosophies of lawyering.153 
D. Role Plays 
Role plays are an excellent method by which students can become 
personally involved in making decisions and exercising professional judgment.  
In the role plays students will by necessity adopt some philosophy of 
lawyering.  In the critique following the role play, the instructor could focus 
the discussion on description of the philosophy used by the student, 
justifications for the approach, and alternative approaches that could be used. 
CONCLUSION 
Lawyers develop different approaches to lawyering, but they often do so 
more by happenstance than careful reflection.  Courses in professional 
responsibility can assist students in developing their philosophies of lawyering 
with greater care.  In this article I have tried to offer a number of illustrations 
of how this goal can be achieved. 
 
 152. See CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2.  The teacher’s manual to 
my book discusses how many videos can be used in a course on professional responsibility.  See 
CRYSTAL, supra note 74. 
 153. See Monroe H. Freedman, Atticus Finch—Right and Wrong, 45 ALA. L. REV. 473, 482 
(1994) (arguing that Finch is “not an adequate role model for today’s lawyer” because of his 
unwillingness to use his legal skills to work toward alleviating injustice). 
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